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gation to the state, or, if business as such owes an extra obligation,23
the tax should be on all business.
In addition to a lack of actual equality in classification the license
system is subject to criticism as regards the measure of the tax on
enterprises within the same formal classification. In effect, when the
same tax applies to firms of diverse ability to pay this is a discrimina-
tion against the smaller firms. Some taxes are flat rates without re-
gard to extent of activity ;24 others are graduated according to the
population of the town in which the business operates, 25 which man-
ifestly is an inaccurate gauge of ability; other licenses are measured
by various external signs which may not be good criteria for the levy-
ing of taxes.26 If the license tax is not imposed for revenue but for
regulation, in which the ability principle is not an important consider-
ation, the measure should be selected with regard to the purpose in
view.
E. M. PERKINS.
Taxation-Exemption of Property Bought with Federal War
Risk Insurance or Compensation Money.
An act of congress1 provides that the money payable to veterans
of the World War shall be exempt from "all taxation." A later sec-
tion2 adds that "no sum payable under this chapter . . . shall be
subject . . . to national or state taxation." Three state supreme
'T. S. Adams, The Taxation of Business, Poc. NAT. TAx AssN. (1917)
185. "A large part of the cost of business is traceable to the necessity of main-
taining a suitable environment.' ". .. business ought to be taxed because it
costs money to maintain a market and those costs should in some way be dis-
tributed over all the beneficiaries of that market'
' Of 131 license taxes in the 1931 Revenue Act, 37 are flat rates, 25 are
measured according to population, and 69 have various measuring devices such
as type and size of equipment used, gross receipts, persons accommodated,
persons employed.
At first thought net income would seem to be the most equitable and effica-
cious measuring device. However, administrative difficulties of a tax measured
by net income might prohibit such a device.
'Moving pictures, soda fountains, laundries, and automotive service stations
are among those measured by population. N. C. PuB. LAWS (1931) c. 427, §105,
§144, §150, §153. Obviously the individual enterprises within these groups are
of diverse profitableness.
' Various measures have been sustained. Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N. C. 119
(1878) (volume of business) ; State v. Stevenson, 109 N. C. 730, 14 S. E. 385
(1891) (amount of purchases) ; Cobb v. Commissioners, 122 N. C. 307, 30 S. E.
338 (1898) (gross receipts) ; State v. Carter, 129 N. C. 560, 40 S. E. 11 (1901)
(population) ; Clark v. Maxwell, 197 N. C. 604, 150 S. E. 190 (1929) (tonnage
of trucks).
143 Stat. 613 (1924), 38 U. S. C. A. §454 (1928).
243 Stat. 125 (1924), 38 U. S. C. A. §618 (1928).
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courts have construed these sections recently with somewhat varying
results. The Kansas court decided that corporate securities bought
with federal insurance money were not exempt from state taxation.3
The Georgia court decided that land bought with such money was
exempt.4 The North Carolina court held that land and an automobile
bought in part with compensation money could not escape any part of
the assessed taxation.5
The Georgia court in reaching its conclusion that, under these
statutes, land bought with federal insurance money was exempt from
all taxation, applied the specific exemption of a "sum" to property
bought with this "sum" as well. The underlying reason for the de-
cision seems to have been one of policy. The court reasons that such
exemption from state taxation adds value to the federal aid; that it
encourages World War veterans to buy homes for themselves instead
of spending foolishly the money paid them by the federal govern-
ment.
In view of this decision some pertinent questions might be raised
as to what extent the Georgia court would carry its exemption policy.
Would land for which this exempted land had been exchanged also
be exempt? Would personal property bought either with the
csum" or with the proceeds of the sale of this exempted land be
exempt? Would profit realized from transactions involving this
exempted sum be exempt even as to the income tax?G Does this
exemption apply with reference to the inheritance tax?T If either
the legal justification or the policy of this decision is followed to its
logical conclusion it seems that these questions would have to be
answered in the affirmative. The complications and absurdities to
which such holdings would lead are apparent. It would be possible
'State, ex rel Smith, Att'y. Gen'l. v. Board of County Commissioners of
Shawnee County, 132 Kan. 233, 294 Pac. 915 (1931).
' Rucker, Tax Collector v. Merck, 159 S. E. 501 (Ga. 1931).
'Martin v. Guilford County, et al, 201 N. C. 63, 158 S. E. 847 (1931).
'Bednar v. Carroll, 133 Iowa 338, 116 N. W. 315 (1908), holds that interest
on pension money exempt from taxation is not itself exempt.
The question of the application of the inheritance tax has been passed upon.
In Watkins v. Hall, 107 W. Va. 202, 147 S. E. 876 (1929), it was held that
since the heirs took as beneficiaries under the policy, they were exempt by the
express provision of these statutes from paying the inheritance tax. See also:
Commonwealth v. Rife, 119 Ohio St. 83, 162 N. E. 390 (1928) ; In re Harris'
Estate, 179 Minn. 450, 229 N. W. 781 (1930) ; The Succession of Greier, 155
La. 167, 99 So. 26 (1924). But in In re Schaefer's Estate, 224 N. Y. Supp. 305(1927), it was held that the inheritance tax was a tax on the right to inherit
and not on the property itself. Therefore, an exemption of the property by
statute would not affect this tax.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
for war veterans to build up small fortunes that the state could not
tax. It would be a very difficult task to administer the tax laws.
The policy of the decision might be further questioned. Is it the
function of the state to protect payments by the federal government
to veterans of National Wars? Granting this, it does not seem that
the protection should take the form of exempting real estate from
taxation.8
The North Carolina9 and Kansas courts ° have reached a much
more desirable result, both from the standpoint of policy in tax ex-
emptions and that of practical administration of tax laws. Congress,
they say, had no intention by these statutes to exempt property in
the states from taxation. Under these decisions no property is taken
out of taxation; the complicated problem of taxing property bought
in part only with war risk money does not arise; nor does there arise
the perplexing question as to how far and to what extent the ex-
emption should apply.
However, the reasoning of the Kansas court, which the North
Carolina court apparently adopts, leads one to believe that it would
hold the money itself taxable once it had been paid to the veteran.1 1
The court says the exemption of a "sum payable" means an exemp-
tion only while it remains payable; that is, unpaid. After it is paid
it is no longer payable, hence the provision for tax exemption does
'This would place an increased burden on tax payers by reducing the amount
of property to be taxed. Theoretically, in a state that makes no distinction
between the taxation of tangible and intangible property, there would be no less
property to be taxed, since the money paid by the veteran for the property could
be taxed in the hands of the vendor. But actually, the money paid for such
real estate could be invested in an intangible form of property and not declared,
thus escaping taxation. This would necessitate an increased tax rate, to be
borne by those who could not hide their property.
'Martin v. Guilford County, et al, supra note 5.
"0 State, ex rel Smith, Att'y. Gen'l. v. Board of County Commissioners of
Shawnee County, supra note 3.
U The Kansas court draws an analogy between the present statute and one
passed in 1873, having reference to pensions. 17 Stat. 576 (1873), 38 U. S.
C. A. 54 (1928). The court holds that "payable" in the statute under consid-
eration means the same as the words, "due or to become due" in the statute of
1873. The words of the latter statute have been construed by the Supreme
Court of the United States to provide for an exemption only up to the time of
the delivery of the money. McIntosh v. Aubrey, 185 U. S. 122, 22 Sup. Ct.
561, 46 L. ed. 834 (1902). But there is a distinction between these two statutes.
The last part of the statute of 1873 clearly limits the first part and makes it
applicable only to money in the process of transmission to the pensioner.
However, the New York Supreme Court in 1927 in It re Schaefer's Estate,
supra note 7, places the same interpretation on the federal statute of 1924 as
does the Kansas court in State, ex rel. Smith, Att'y. Gen'l. v. Board of County
Commissioners of Shawnee County, supra note 3.
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not apply. This construction seems contrary to the intention of con-
gress,12 and it is an unreasonable and somewhat strained interpre-
tation of the actual language of the statutes. It might lead to diffi-
culties should the actual case for the taxation of the money itself be
presented.
WILLIAM MEDFORD.
Taxation-Exemption of State Governmental Instrumentalities
from Federal Taxation.
The plaintiff, a manufacturer of motorcycles in Massachusetts,
sold one of its machines to a Massachusetts municipality for use in
its police department. An excise tax was levied and collected from
the plaintiff in conformity with Revenue Act, 1924,1 §600, which
provides that there shall be paid upon motorcycles, etc., sold or leased
by the manufacturer, producer, or importer a tax equivalent to five
per cent of the price for which so sold or leased. The plaintiff sued
to recover the amount of the tax. Held: The tax was on the sale
alone and could not be upheld as it infringed the exemption of state
governmental instrumentalities from federal taxation.2
The instant case follows the language of a bare majority decision
of the Supreme Court in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi,8 where a
state excise tax levied on the distributor of gasoline, assessed on the
number of gallons sold, was disallowed on a sale to a federal agency.
In the intervening case of Wheeler Lumber Co. v. U. S.,4 a united
court upheld a tax on transportation charges for materials sold and
shipped to state instrumentalities, on the ground that the tax was not
on the materials or the sale but on a preliminary service rendered the
seller. Decisions of a federal district court0 and of a state supreme
Congress, by these two acts, expressly provides for the exemption of this
money from taxation. The money, in the hands of federal authorities, could
not be assessed and taxed against an individual who has not received it. There-
fore, this provision for tax exemption would seem superfluous in the light of
the reasoning of the Kansas court.
Two cases have applied the provisions of the instant statute to money
already paid the veteran. Payne v. Jordan, 152 Ga. 356, 110 S. E. 4 (1921)
(money held by administrator exempt from claims of creditors of veteran) ;
Wilson v. Sawyer, 177 Ark. 492, 6 S. W. (2d) 825 (1928), (sum paid to veteran
not subject to garnishment proceedings).
143 Stat. 322 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. §881 (1927).
'Indian Motorcycle Co. v. U. S., 283 U. S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601 (1931).
Justice Stone dissents; Justice Brandeis concurs.
'277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, 72 L. ed. 857, 56 A. L. R. 583 (1928) which
overruled 147 Miss. 663 112 So. 584 (1927). Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone,
and McReynolds dissent.
'281 U. S. 572, 50 Sup. Ct. 419, 74 L. ed. 1047 (1930).
